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In Ottoman studies, it is only in the last decade 
that colonialism has been considered a useful 
analytical category. This may be partly due to the 
fact that, in the 1970s and 80s, especially in ap-
proaches which drew on the dependency the-
ory and the integration of the Ottoman Empire 
into the world economy, the latter was studied 
as one of those regions which was never effec-
tively colonised.1 However, recently postcolo-
nial studies have attracted the interest of nine-
teenth-century historians who have reversed 
the argument and tend to include the Ottoman 
Empire not among the states that were subject 
to colonisation but among the colonisers. The 
aim of this paper is to critically approach the re-
cent literature that one way or another utilis-
es terminology and narratives that derive from 
the area of postcolonial studies. It also aspires 
to suggest an alternative way of engaging with 
the condition of colonisation, by drawing on re-
ligious divisions. Specifically it looks at Chris-
tians, and more particularly Greek Orthodox, as 
potentially colonised populations or agents of 
colonisation, respectively. 
As Selim Deringil has put it, in one of the sem-
inal studies in this respect, “sometime in the 
nineteenth century the Ottoman elite adopted 
the mindset of their enemies, the arch-imperi-
alists and came to conceive of its periphery as 
a colonial setting”.2 Building on Albert Hourani’s 
depiction of the Ottomans as the “Romans of the 
Muslim world”,3 Deringil introduces the term 
“borrowed colonialism”, a term firstly used in 
the Russian context to describe a phenomenon 
which developed in parallel with European colo-
nialism.4 In his view, within this context coloni-
alism was a “survival tactic” and, therefore, the 
Ottoman Empire is very different from “the ag-
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er words, he claims that the Ottomans were fully aware that they had to qualify as a colonial power 
if they were not to end up as a colony themselves. 
Reflecting on why the Ottoman phenomenon had not been studied within this context, Deringil 
claims that the history of the Ottoman Empire was “perched” between western historiography, on 
the one hand, and the study of the “Muslims/Middle Easterners who matter” (i.e. Arabs, Jews, Ira-
nians, Indians), on the other. He criticises subaltern studies, therefore, for being preoccupied with 
the “evils of colonialism” and ignoring a “major non-western sovereign state whose destinies were 
in many ways intertwined with the destinies of India”.5 Moreover, he attributes the abovementioned 
ignorance to non-western historians who tend to be eurocentric along with the long-standing prac-
tice of European historians to ignore the historiography of the third world, which Dipesh Chakra-
barty has described as the “inequality of ignorance”.6 As the Bengali historian put it more bluntly 
recently, if Europe is a universal paradigm for modernity, we are all, European and non-European, 
to a degree inescapably Eurocentric.7 
It is clear that Deringil is not engaging in an overall critical re-evaluation with regard to post colonial 
studies. It is not my purpose to do that here, either. It is actually quite interesting that such a de-
bate appeared in the field of Ottoman studies when the paradigm itself had lost its momentum 
and was definitely less appealing than before. However, this might be exactly one of the reasons 
for such an engagement. The criticism of postcolonial studies followed extreme and mutually con-
tradicting paths. On the one hand, historians in various fields were accused of trying to implement 
the relevant paradigm on apparently any historical period, such as colonialism in ancient Rome 
or early modern Venice. On the other hand, critics argued that postcolonial historians were so ob-
sessed with the particular period and geography that they were unable to properly historicise the 
phenomenon and connect to similar experiences in other geographies. As I have mentioned, Der-
ingil belongs to the second category. The real issue, however, for our purposes, is not whether the 
storm of criticism would compel postcolonial historians to adopt a broader perspective, but why 
and under what circumstances the Ottoman Empire can or should be compared with other em-
pires. I will return to this point later.
Deringil refers to Ussama Makdisi’s 2000 study which “situates the Tanzimat reform process and 
reactions to it in the subaltern discourse” as the first attempt to introduce the Ottoman Empire to 
this historiographical debate.8 Makdisi’s ideas, though, follow a different trajectory. He sets out 
from the deconstruction of the “decline” thesis in recent literature in order to argue that Ottoman-
ists, in their effort to shed light on the complex Ottoman phenomenon, have paid little attention to 
a notion of Ottoman imperialism which he relates to the empire’s bid to become a modern nation-
state.9 He uses, of course, an example that is rather “too obvious” in order to prove his claim, that 
of the Arab lands, which are described as “backward, primitive and savage and which ‘constituted’ 
metaphorical spaces in which Istanbul-centred reformers elaborated a notion of what Ottoman 
modernity was, i.e. rational, scientific and civilised”.10 
More recently, in 2005, Makdisi addressed the same configuration of power from the vantage 
point of cultural analysis, building on the debate on Orientalism and articulating his own percep-
tion of what he calls “Ottoman Orientalism”, namely a complex of Ottoman attitudes produced 








by the nineteenth-century age of Ottoman reform that acknowledged the west as the home of 
progress and the east the site of backwardness. He, himself, pays his tribute to Deringil and his 
conceptualisation of “borrowed colonialism” and points out the fact that “through efforts to study, 
discipline, and improve imperial subjects, Ottoman reform created a notion of the pre-modern 
within the empire in a manner akin to the way European colonial administrators represented 
their colonial subjects”.117 But then, he adds that this process contributed to the formation of a 
modern Ottoman Turkish nation that had to lead the other “stagnant ethnic and national groups” 
into an Ottoman modernity. One wonders whether these stagnant groups could be anything oth-
er than the Arabs, or even than the Muslims in general, to begin with? Moreover, the assump-
tion that this version of Orientalism led to the articulation of a Turkish national identity seems 
too far-fetched. I will return to that too. 
Let me address here the issue of terminology. There are so many terms that suddenly appeared 
to attract our attention. Apart from “Ottoman Orientalism”, we also have “Orientalism alla turca”,11 
as it appears in Christoph Herzog and Raoul Motika’s “Orientalism Alla Turca: Late 19th/Early 20th 
century Ottoman voyages into the Muslim ‘outback’”; the “Ottoman civilising mission” in Christoph 
Herzog’s “Nineteenth-century Baghdad through Ottoman eyes”;12 the “Ottoman man’s burden”13 
and “modern Ottoman imperialism”, again in Makdisi;14 Deringil’s terms of “borrowed colonialism” 
and the “Ottoman colonial project”; and “colonial Ottomanism”,15 used by Thomas Kühn to describe 
the same phenomenon in his study on Yemen. 
This terminological inflation,16 apart from obstructing methodological clarity, denotes also differ-
ent historiographical agendas. Certainly, the motivations of these historians are not the same, nor 
do they all subscribe to the postcolonial criticism as such. While Deringil intends to place the Ot-
toman Empire on a par with the major European colonial empires of the era, claiming in scholar-
ship what the Ottomans themselves never managed to achieve in politics, Makdisi seems to ad-
dress the same issue from the point of view of the alleged subaltern, building on an old-fashioned 
perception of the Tanzimat centre–periphery debate and an understanding of the Turkish nature 
of the Ottoman bureaucracy which reiterates similar perceptions inherited from Arab nationalism. 
Motika and Hertzog, on the other hand, seem to critically address but also at the same time re-
orientalise what they see as a peculiar fashion of Orientalism, whereas Kühn, historiographically 
speaking, sticks to a safer example, that of Yemen, since that was the only real Ottoman colony, 
sensu stricto, in the second half of the nineteenth century, a territory whose conquest was justified 
on the grounds of protecting the Islamic world against the imperialist west, but which, in the end, 
was invested with the narrative of a civilising mission very similar to the western ones. Based on 
the study of the conundrum that Yemen presented for Ottoman bureaucrats, he argues that the 
Tanzimat reformers and their descendents elaborated a form of governance based on “the formali-
sation and reproduction of perceived difference”.17 
This multiplicity of approaches is indicative of the fact that postcolonial criticism has inspired late 
Ottomanists in various ways. Nevertheless, a younger generation of Ottomanist historians, such 
as Özgür Türesay, has argued that postcolonial criticism should be dismissed as irrelevant to the 
study of what this historian describes as a gentilhomme attitude, an outcome of elite training and 
urban culture, on the part of Ottoman officials towards the populations of the periphery.18 Others go 
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even further and dismiss any attempt to compare the Ottoman Empire with other empires. What 
I find problematic here is the regressive attitude, firmly grounded on a notion of Ottoman excep-
tionalism, which is politically and historiographically untimely, and which proves in return why a 
failed comparison is preferable to self-referential arguments. In a special issue of the Comparative 
Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East journal, edited by Dina Khoury and Dane Kennedy, 
the two empires, the Ottoman and the British, are systematically compared. In their introduction, 
“Comparing empires: The Ottoman domains and the British Raj in the long nineteenth century”, 
the editors point out that their purpose involved “shifting the study of empires from narratives that 
differentiate European from non-European variants to those that examine their shared character-
istics … providing a fuller appreciation of the shared cultural challenges they confronted and the 
connective issues that bound them together”.19 Among the volume’s interesting articles, the most 
typical example for our purpose is offered by Thomas Kühn, whom I mentioned earlier.
Actually, the Ottoman Empire has been placed in comparative perspective in the past in differ-
ent historiographical contexts with respect to the continental empires. Such an endeavour was 
first carried out in the context of the paradigm of integration into the world economy, and Ottom-
anist historians, whose work focused mostly on the economy, became internationally renowned 
through the pages of the Review journal, published by the Fernand Braudel Centre at Binghamton.20 
More recently, a younger generation of scholars that also focuses on politics and culture reiterated 
this comparative approach.21 Another thread of comparison was initiated by the fall of the commu-
nist regimes and the re-emergence of empire as a model that was no longer regarded as politically 
illegitimate and academically marginal.22 The revived interest in empire has been described as the 
“imperial turn”.23 In more recent works, comparison seems to be taking root in the academic pro-
duction on the Ottoman Empire, at least in the US.24
In this last part, I would like to focus on a particular aspect of this debate. Deringil has already de-
scribed the “premodern” Turkish/Islamic tradition of the Ottoman Empire prior to the Tanzimat and 
the “modern” enlightenment practices which it introduced as two halves of the Ottoman colonial 
project which were not hermeneutically sealed off from one another. In his view, what makes Ot-
toman “borrowed colonialism” interesting is the fact that “the Ottoman modernity project was the 
result of historical processes and trends which were already taking place in the eighteenth cen-
tury”.25 There is, however, one particular issue related to Deringil’s analysis that I would like to ad-
dress. He portrays the particularity of the “Ottoman version of colonialism” as related to the com-
monality of religion, since his study focuses on a condition where the ruler and the ruled are of 
the same religion, namely Islam. This precondition is important in the attempt to understand how 
this version diverges from the western Christian ruler–non-Christian-ruled version. However, and 
if we disregard the importance of the confessional divide that for the Hamidian era plays a major 
role, one wonders whether it would be of any use to study, within “the Ottoman version of coloni-
alism”, cases where the roles of the western version have been reversed, namely where the ruled 
was a non-Muslim and the ruler a Muslim. In this discussion, there is the implicit assumption that 
culture, which in this era took the form of a modern reconfiguration of religion, as conceptualised 
by Gellner,26 was an important denominator in shaping collectivities on both sides of the political 
bipolar divide. In other words, social attitudes or ethnic divisions can be based on the grounds of 
religious or, occasionally, confessional affiliation.








If we accept that this assumption is valid, what did it mean for a Christian to be subordinate to a 
Muslim, in terms of colonial domination? I find this to be a legitimate question. At the same time, 
one should not disregard the slippery ground on which such a discussion is carried out. For the 
simple reason that if we are to place the Ottoman Empire in a comparative perspective with the 
rest of the historically more recent empires, such as the British one, we should be ready to carry the 
argument to its logical conclusion, namely the recognition that Ottoman rule was a form of “foreign 
domination”. However, even if, in many areas, there was a clear divide between the local popular 
culture and the administrative elite, such a conclusion would be difficult to substantiate. One has to 
bear in mind that we are referring to nineteenth-century colonial experience and not to fifteenth-
century territorial expansion. In other words, we cannot project the notion of “foreign domination”, 
which certainly resonates with the notion of “illegitimate rule”, as this is defined by nineteenth-cen-
tury nationalist narratives, back to the premodern era; otherwise, we would be reiterating the eth-
nocentric perspective of national historiographies. Makdisi has been accused of doing exactly this, 
as he assumes that Ottoman rule in the Arab lands always had the attributes of colonial rule. He 
thus forges a clear modern divide for the nineteenth century, projecting it back to a premodern era. 
Nevertheless, even if we do not essentialise either Ottoman rule or the distinction between Mus-
lims and non-Muslims, the issue still remains. Could the debate on Ottoman colonialism and its 
cultural component, Ottoman Orientalism, be meaningful for studies related to power structures 
involving both religious groups? Makdisi, despite his Arabocentric perspective, hints at an answer 
by arguing that the empire’s commonality with the Muslim majority “was implicitly and explicitly 
framed within a civilisational and temporal discourse that ultimately justified Ottoman Turkish rule 
over Muslim and non-Muslim subjects, over Arabs, Armenians, Kurds, Bulgarians, etc”.27
More recently, Ebru Boyar in her own work has focused on Ottoman and Turkish perceptions of 
the Balkans.28 In her chapter “The Balkan people and the Balkan states”, she discusses Ottoman 
condescension towards the petty Balkan states, which is reminiscent of Ottoman colonial attitudes 
in the Arab periphery. Persistent references to the Serbs as “pig farmers”, for instance, are com-
mensurate with the dominant, late-nineteenth-century European discourse that viewed the Bal-
kan peoples, to borrow Ipek Yosmaoğlu’s words, “as noble savages at best and corrupt slaves at 
worst, but also the ways in which this discourse penetrated the Balkan peoples’ (and, evidently, the 
Ottomans’) own formulations of a sliding scale of nations”.29 Could, however, condescension and 
contempt in this context be equated with European colonial attitudes?
There is a second issue, though, that concerns the presence of the other empires within the territory 
of the Ottoman Empire: the capitulations, which were used in order to protect many non-Muslim Ot-
toman subjects as well. From as early as the seventeenth century, through the granting of conces-
sions to foreign powers in the form of bilateral agreements (ahdname) or documents of exemption 
(berat) provided to individuals, many enjoyed the status of extra-territoriality. As the Ottoman Empire 
lost ground in the international power balance, such agreements were used as a pretext for straight-
forward intervention in Ottoman domestic affairs. As a result, the subject non-Muslims, through prof-
iting from the presence of other colonial powers, managed to partially avoid being monitored by the 
Ottoman authorities. This describes a picture where the ruler and the ruled, the coloniser and the 
colonised, the dominant and the subaltern, were continuously changing roles. 
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Contrary to conventional wisdom, it seems that in the final decades of the Ottoman Empire a certain 
group from among the Christian, mostly middle-class elites (Greek Orthodox, Armenian or Assyr-
ian) had their own vision of Ottoman society which was not necessarily inspired by a nationalist or 
separatist passion. Instead, they had developed their own version of a mission civilisatrice which, 
in their eyes, was justified by their superior economic and cultural status compared to the Muslim 
population and, even, the Muslim elite. Such attitudes contributed to the tension and antagonism 
between ethnically distinct elites, who soon abandoned the option of an all-encompassing Ottoman 
middle class that would lead the way to modernisation, and they took it upon themselves, each one 
separately, to justify their leading role in this process. The question that needs to be addressed is 
how fruitful would it be to extend the controversial debate on the colonial overtones of the ruling 
elites in the Tanzimat and post-Tanzimat era, as introduced by Deringli, Makdisi and others, to a 
different era, that of the post-1908 constitutional regime, which was politically dominated by a very 
different kind of bureaucratic and military personnel, who themselves wished to break from what 
they saw as the failed policies of the Tanzimat. 
As I have argued elsewhere, this was the era when a large part of the Muslim and non-Muslim pop-
ulation, could, for the first time, enjoy the privilege of aspiring for a better future for themselves and 
their families. “Middle class” values were endorsed by many who, while hoping for personal social 
improvement, at the same time sought to take over the control of the lower classes, either from the 
state or from the upper class, and thus establish a new hegemony which can be attributed with the 
quality of “internal colonialism”.30 In the context of ethnic rivalry and political instability, the above con-
cerns acquired a very different dimension.31 Notions such as progress, order and proper behaviour 
became the values not of a “middle class” but of a “Turkish–Muslim middle class” or a “Greek Ortho-
dox middle class” – with different claims to Ottomanness to be sure – but with the fear that if a rival 
claim to Ottomanness should prevail, first and foremost the one promoted by the Young Turks, all 
other alternatives would perish.32 That’s why the respective discourses became sharper, more ag-
gressive and, occasionally, even adopted a colonial mentality. This should not come as a surprise. 
Apart from colonial models being much more available now than what was the case during the Tan-
zimat era, the Young Turks, despite their internal divisions, were inspired, as Şükru Hanioğlu has aptly 
shown,33 by ideas drawing on positivism and social engineering more than anything else.
***
The recent proliferation within late Ottoman studies of works that utilise terminology and concepts 
that were first introduced by postcolonial literature certainly cannot be a coincidence. On the one 
hand, it reveals an attempt to integrate the study of the Ottoman Empire into the broader “imperial 
turn” that has emerged in recent years. On the other, it paves the ground for a revisionist approach 
that aims not necessarily at delegitimising Ottoman rule but definitely at establishing a stricter di-
vision between the local population and the administrative elite. It is important to remember that 
a comparison with the British or French empires is not the only possible option, though. In fact, 
the Ottoman Empire has been already studied in the context of continental empires. Moreover, the 
way Arabs, Armenians or Greek Orthodox could be integrated into the Ottoman elites does not re-
semble the Algerian or Raj cases. After all, one could attribute the recent choice to compare the 
Ottoman with the British Empire to a historiographical strategy that aims at conveniently situating 








Ottoman studies in Anglo-Saxon academia. However, I argue that, even if postcolonial criticism 
cannot be uncritically applied to late Ottoman studies, the main focus of its agenda, namely the way 
that history and culture are utilised in politics in order to forge patterns of hierarchy, can benefit the 
study of power structures across diverse ethnic or religious boundaries. 
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